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THE CHANGING FACE OF GERMAN BUSINESS:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
Germany has become an affluent society and a leading industrial na-
tion during the postwar years. There is much to be admired in this coun-
try: prosperity without visible poverty, thriving inner cities, convenient
public transportation, an excellent infrastructure, and concern for the en-
vironment. In Germany’s social market economy the interests of busi-
ness, government, and society are assumed to be the same (Bowles 22),
and accordingly the country maintains a social security net that provides
generous benefits: education, health care, unemployment protection, wel-
fare, pensions, and leisure time. Exports have exceeded imports every
year since 1951, and by 1989 the Federal Republic had become the
world’s second largest creditor and largest exporter (Tillier 199). Rela-
tionships between employers and employees have been characterized by
cooperation and harmony. Banking and business form an industrial-fi-
nancial alliance that is both stable and highly resistant to takeovers
(Albert 108). Government and industry’s vocational training system pro-
duces a workforce so highly skilled it is the envy of its competitors eve-
rywhere (Randlesome 147). In short, Germany has been very successful
in striking the right balance between social concerns and economic
growth; it is indeed a market economy, but a very humane one
(Glouchevich 12).
Is this an acceptable portrait of Germany? Yes, but only through the
late eighties. A more accurate description of Germany in the nineties
would look like the following.
The cost of reunification has exceeded expectations, taxes have risen
accordingly, and unemployment is high. Germany has become the most
expensive industrial location in the world and this has serious conse-
quences. Production continues to be moved abroad to take advantage of
lower labor costs, leaving Germany’s highly skilled but expensive labor
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force to the unemployment lines. Industry and labor have been forced
into adversarial positions because of these job reductions. European Un-
ion procurement rules mandate that governments seek bids on
manufacturing projects from across Europe, not just within national
boundaries; companies from other countries with cheaper labor are win-
ning the contracts within Germany (“Germany’s Construction Headaches
Build”). European Community member nations are encouraged to begin
using common accounting methods to facilitate the exchange and com-
parison of financial information. German business is not used to, or com-
fortable with, this degree of disclosure. It gives shareholders a more ac-
curate picture of a company’s financial position, and they are demanding
that companies pay more attention to profit and loss. Banking’s tradi-
tional role as large shareholders in major industry with seats on their su-
pervisory boards is being criticized. The original system of checks and
balances may have turned into one of mutual support and protection.
Germany’s small to medium size companies have been failing in record
numbers. As suppliers to major industry they have suffered from the vig-
orous cost-cutting measures undertaken by the industrial giants in the last
decade. Inheritance taxes on business assets are so high that heirs are
unwilling to take over the family firm (“German Tax Debate”).
None of the changes that have been taking place during the last dec-
ade happened suddenly. Whatever changes were in progress in the Ger-
many of the eighties have been exacerbated by three developments:
reunification, progress toward European economic union, and globaliza-
tion. How did Germany get where it is today and what are the conse-
quences of its having done so?
THE SOCIAL SECURITY NET AND THE STATUS OF TAX REFORM
The social market economy has two underlying principles:1) the mar-
ket should be as free as possible, particularly with respect to prices and
wages (Randlesome xi), and 2) market forces alone cannot govern all
aspects of society. Germany intends that social welfare measures must be
available to those who cannot provide for their own food, housing, health
care, and necessary consumer goods (Albert 156). Bismarck took the first
modest steps toward creating a social security system to meet the needs
of workers at a time of rapid industrialization. It has been developed
steadily ever since, funded lavishly by obligatory employer and em-
ployee contributions (Drucker, Post Capitalist Society 122). It is so gen-
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erous that its unemployed often enjoy greater benefits—free health care,
for example—than the working poor in the United States (Schlaes,
“Germany’s Chained Economy” 117). Paying for these generous social
benefits has had consequences, however. Germany now has the highest
labor costs, the highest environmental protection costs, the highest per-
sonal and corporate taxes, but the shortest work week (Kurland 55),
making united Germany the most expensive industrial location in the
world, and less desirable as a site for manufacturing.
The contributions that employers are required to make to the compre-
hensive social security system have increased steadily, adding to the
soaring labor costs. The cost of labor in the chemical industry is, for ex-
ample, over $40 an hour, twice as high as in the US (Marsh 125). On the
average, for every DM 100 of gross pay, the employer pays another DM
84 in social costs; some of these costs are the result of deals between
firms and unions, rather than imposed from the government (“Springtime
for Germany” 19) The high cost of labor has caused many major manu-
facturers to reduce their expensive domestic work force and expand in-
ternationally to produce goods more cheaply abroad (“Job Losses Soar”);
these reductions in the domestic labor force have logically led to higher
unemployment.
As unemployment rose during the recession of the early 1980s, gov-
ernment had to spend even more to assist the unemployed. Employees
receive about two-thirds of their net wages for up to fifteen months and
about 90% of that in welfare cash thereafter. The government also pro-
vides retraining programs and offers incentives to public and private or-
ganizations to hire the unemployed (Schlaes, “Germany’s Chained Econ-
omy” 114). The intensifying debate among labor unions, employers, and
politicians about how to stem the exporting of jobs by German compa-
nies has produced no solutions, although a few unions have offered to
exchange some of their wage demands for promises by companies of job
creation or job security (“German Economy Gets More Bad News”).
The cost of health care benefits continues to climb as well. An em-
ployee is guaranteed six weeks of sick leave a year on full pay; after that
the health insurance takes over with benefits for another eighteen months
(Ardagh 199). As the population ages, the payroll tax rate for health in-
surance will rise considerably if no policy reform takes place (Jacquemin
256). Restructuring of the system is the alternative, but it is understanda-
bly a political minefield. Complaints come from not only consumers, but
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also powerful interest groups, drug companies, doctors’ associations,
hospital operators, etc. (Marsh 315).
The average German worker is entitled to about six weeks of paid
vacation, plus a dozen or so days off on state and religious holidays. This
generous leisure time package for workers means days without produc-
tion, but days that cost money nonetheless. Tax reformers suspect that
too much pampering by welfare services has made people willing to
work even less hard; in some cases these benefits are rewards for staying
permanently unemployed. Germans have reached the limits of tolerance
for tax increases; they are asking for tax reform, and to do so means
making cuts in benefits. Proposals have been made that would penalize
staying on welfare for those who are largely competent and healthy and
whose main incapacity is welfare itself (Drucker, Managing a Time of
Great Change 327).
A separate, but related, problem is the aging of the German popula-
tion. This will inevitably lead to severe financial problems for the social
security system as well, particularly with regard to pensions. In 1950
only 9.4% of the population was 65 or older (Marsh 309); by the year
2030 the figure is projected to be 37%. The birthrate in Germany has
been declining since the early seventies; in 1989 for example there were
16,000 more deaths than births (Federal Republic of Germany 46). With
the German “pay as you go” method of publicly funding pensions, the
declining birthrate will mean that there will be fewer workers responsible
for supporting an increasing number of pensioners (Schlaes, “Germany’s
Chained Economy” 121).
Spending on social security in 1960 amounted to a reasonable 16% of
gross national product (sum total value of goods and services provided)
but by 1994 it had risen to 50%. Taken together, the declining birthrate
and aging of the population can be expected to bring manpower short-
ages, social security deficits, and increased expenditure on pensions. The
generosity of this social security net in its current configuration may be a
luxury Germany can no longer afford (Borrmann 118).
Over the years politicians have debated much about raising revenue
by privatizing services. In the early ’80s Kohl announced a plan to sell
partial or total holdings in some federal assets, mentioning Volkswagen,
Lufthansa, Deutsche Telekom, and Deutsche Bundesbahn among many
others. This would release large amounts of capital, which could be used
to subsidize future-oriented technologies (Randlesome 3). At the same
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time a total overhaul of the tax system was discussed, but by 1987 Ger-
man companies were still paying a total tax of 70% on retained earnings.
A small reform was achieved in that year, however: The government
rolled back top personal income tax rates from 56% to 53% and corpo-
rate tax to 50% (Schlaes “Tax Reform Takes Root”). Privatization did get
started, even if slowly, and by the end of the decade the government had
reduced the number of companies in which it had direct or indirect hold-
ings from the 1982 figure of 808 companies to 132 companies, raising
DM 10 billion in the process (Randlesome 7).
Then the unexpected happened: Reunification (Zapf 35). Kohl’s 1990
election pledge not to raise taxes to pay for reunification was partially
based on privatizing Deutsche Bundespost Telekom; this would have
raised about DM 20 billion, but the government ruled out the idea
(Randlesome 9). Instead, measures were announced in early 1991 to raise
about DM 30 billion through a dozen or so tax increases. These pushed
marginal rates up to around 60% for individuals and higher than that for
corporations. On top of everything else came the solidarity surcharge to
pay for the east (“Kohl Announces Sharp Spending Cuts”). Unemploy-
ment climbed past 10% and the economy retreated into the second reces-
sion in three years. Revenue shortfalls were in the tens of billions of
marks, raising the national budget deficit to 3.6% of gross domestic
product, which became an embarrassing problem. The Maastricht Treaty
on European Union specified a ceiling on the national budget deficit for
member nations of 3% of gross domestic product (“German Economy
Gets More Bad News”). Germany had continually urged its neighbors to
keep their budget deficits below the limit so that the 1998 target date for
European monetary union would not be threatened (“Germany Won’t
Meet”).
In early 1996 the Germans were finally ready to do more than talk
about tax reform. Even “die Forbes Idee,” Steve Forbes’s flat tax, at-
tracted attention (Schlaes “Tax Reform Takes Root”). Kohl’s coalition
agreed on a budget-cutting program that would reduce or eliminate a
wide range of taxes on business and households and scale back the na-
tion’s welfare system. Among other things, the 50-point program would
reduce sick pay, eliminate early retirements, raise the retirement age for
women, make pension payments less generous, eliminate or reduce local
business taxes, cut national inheritance and gift taxes, and support the
creation of small and medium-size businesses by improving access to
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venture capital (“Germany, France Unveil Economic Plans”). Unem-
ployment benefits would be limited to one year for those younger than
45, and companies would have more discretion in firing workers
(“Germany’s Kohl Settles”). CDU economic spokesman Uldall even
proposed reducing the top marginal rate on personal income from 53% to
28%, but the immediate reaction by politicians was that such a cut was
“not realizable,” falling back on the old habit of not taking into account
the stimulative effects of tax reform on the productive economy
(“German Tax Debate”). In summer 1996 the discussion was less about
welfare reform and a reduction in personal income tax and and more
about raising the VAT, Germany’s rate of 15% being one of the lowest in
Europe (“Meanwhile in Germany”). German businesspeople agree, how-
ever, that if the job-destroying tax system remains, German businesses
will continue to move production abroad (“German Tax Debate”).
THE INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE ON
GERMAN ACCOUNTING METHODS
In the US, where business depends heavily on the stock market for the
provision of capital, accounting principles tend to be shareholder-driven.
A company demonstrates success by showing high profits; this makes
management look good and keeps the share price high. In addition, high
share prices help protect against unwanted (hostile) takeovers. In Ger-
many the situation is the opposite; accounting is tax-driven. Companies
are motivated to minimize profits because tax authorities use published
company financial statements to determine the size of a company’s tax
bill. Since German business has traditionally relied on banks to provide
capital, accounting principles are oriented toward protecting these credi-
tor banks rather than informing the investor (Randlesome 92–94).
Showing high profits would likely mean that more would have to be paid
out to the shareholders in dividends as well as to the government in taxes,
and companies are already very effectively protected against hostile
takeovers by the banks.
Corporate taxes in Germany are much higher than in the US (53% vs.
34%), but German companies get to declare lots of expenses and use
very rapid depreciation to minimize profit. Under German accounting
principles, companies may also set aside money to cover potential li-
abilities. These allowances, deductible for German tax purposes, are not
under US tax law, so German companies are motivated to reserve the
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maximum amount possible under law to reduce the company’s tax bill
(Corbridge 45). When Volkswagen announced its earning for the first
half of 1996, one analyst noted that they had reserved DM 524 million to
cover possible currency loss risk. No wonder VW is therefore still con-
sidered Europe’s least profitable auto maker, even though its earnings
more than doubled (“Volkswagen’s Net”). Taxes can be further mini-
mized by assigning historical cost rather than current market value to
assets, but accounting for liabilities at current value (Randlesome 77).
Keeping the tax bill low allows companies to amass huge, hidden re-
serves in good times, which can then be used to provide stability in lean
times. The bankruptcy rate in Germany is consequently very low, thus
protecting creditors.
The German accounting firm KPMG did a comparison study in 1988
of company results for German subsidiaries in the US using both Ameri-
can and German accounting methods. Earnings using the German calcu-
lations were only 42% of what they would have been using the American
principles (Glouchevich 52). The advantage of this conservative German
approach is that nobody receives any unpleasant surprises. A company
that looks, from previous years’ accounts, apparently healthy does not
appear to get into difficulties virtually overnight (Randlesome 92). The
disadvantage of this approach, as far as shareholders are concerned, is
that profits that could be distributed to them as dividends remain in the
company as reserves.
In 1986, new accounting legislation was introduced that prohibited
expense deductions that resulted in the hidden reserves of the past
(Corbridge 46). In 1995 a securities “watchdog” agency was created; it
has recently chastised companies for failing to comply with laws on
timely disclosure of news that could affect share prices. Many compa-
nies, however, are still following the time-honored practice of not mak-
ing public negative news, hoping that it will be masked by later positive
developments (“German Firms’ Disclosure Faulted”). International ac-
counting practices are having more impact than governmental agencies,
however. EC legislation recommends that its member nations start get-
ting used to International Accounting Standards (IAS) so that compari-
sons can already be made across industries and countries by members of
the international financial community. (Covill 42–43).
As companies try to raise capital internationally, some want to be
listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), but to do so, they must
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use American accounting methods; these are even more stringent than the
IAS. In the early 1990s, Deutsche Bank considered listing its shares on
the NYSE, but was deterred by the disclosure requirements (Matthews
1–2). Daimler-Benz became the first German company to gain a full
listing on the NYSE. A full listing allows the stock to be purchased by
institutional investors, insurance companies, and pension funds as well as
by individual investors. The price Daimler-Benz paid for the full listing,
however, was to produce two sets of accounts, one German and one
American . For 1993 this produced a discrepancy of DM 2.5 billion be-
tween net profit US-style and net-profit German style, which created
concern among shareholders (Covill 43). In 1996 a second German com-
pany, SGL Carbon, gained a NYSE listing, with American investors
buying 40% of its $1 billion stock offering. Chairman Robert Koehler
said meeting the US accounting requirements took only three months. He
felt SGL Carbon could be a model for other companies as they contem-
plated the hurdles of American acounting, looking for ways to raise
capital and restructure loss-making units (“German Ugly Duckling”).
Dresdner Bank gave details about its hidden reserves for the first time
as it announced a 17% increase in net income for 1995, reporting untaxed
reserves of about DM 9 billion, which was essentially the difference be-
tween the historical value and the market value of its holdings of stocks
and bonds. This disclosure amounted to a small revolution among Ger-
man banks, which for decades provided the public with only scant infor-
mation about their true performance. Now shareholders and analysts
looking for the best deal could compare their performance and solidity
with that of international rivals (“Dresdner Bank Posts”). Shareholders
may also be expecting bigger dividends in the future as a result.
Other firms hope that the EC’s international accounting methods will
eventually be accepted as adequate disclosure for a NYSE listing. Major
German chemical firms Bayer and Schering published 1994 year-end
accounts using the IAS. The Securities and Exchange Commission may
indeed be interested in a compromise, since US pension funds are in-
creasingly investing in foreign equities through foreign stock markets,
thus bypassing the New York Stock Exchange (Covill 43).
THE RELATIONSHIP OF BANKING TO MAJOR INDUSTRY
The major German banks, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and
Commerzbank, have their representatives sitting on supervisory boards in
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more than four hundred major west German companies. These supervi-
sory boards have two specific duties: to hire and fire the management
board and approve or deny major financial decisions (Regan 3). The su-
pervisory board together with the management board is supposed to pro-
vide a system of checks and balances. Lately banks have failed to spot
ballooning problems in several major companies and many are concerned
that the system that was originally supposed to provide checks and bal-
ances has become one of mutual support and protection (“After Schnei-
der”).
The 1993 collapse of Metallgesellschaft is a good example of the su-
pervisory board failing to oversee management. Chief Executive Officer
Heinz Schimmelbusch intended to combine American financial engi-
neering with German industrial know-how. He turned a troubled metals,
mining, and trading company into an international conglomerate of 258
companies around the world. When the metals prices dropped by 60%
because of cheap imports from the former East bloc countries, he ac-
quired even more companies. In 1992 he used his financial engineering
skills to book a profit of $147 million for the year by selling off assets.
He then turned to oil futures, hoping to generate quick revenues, but in-
stead brought on the ultimate collapse (Schares 48–49). Where was the
supervisory board when all this was going on? Instead of insisting on
tough enough financial controls, the supervisory board was willing to
trust management. The message was not so much to avoid risk, as it was
to allow greater transparency in financial matters and more stringent
oversight of management by the supervisory board (Schares 48–49).
German banks are “universal banks,” that is, they combine the roles
played in other countries by a variety of different financial institutions:
commercial banks, investment banks, merchant banks, savings banks,
stockbroker and institutional investors (Mole 33). An American equiva-
lent of Deutsche Bank, for example, would have to look something like
this: Chase Manhattan Bank and brokerage firm Merrill Lynch would be
rolled into one, with the investment banking operations of Goldman
Sachs. They would own 10%–25% of the shares in DuPont Chemical,
General Motors, Exxon, and dozens of other major companies and have
seats on their boards of directors (Glouchevich 73). These banks develop
a long-term relationship with a company by offering them a complete
range of financial services.
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The power of these banks lies in the size and diversity of their share-
holdings in Germany’s major companies. The banks typically hold shares
for the long term, so they are interested in the financial well-being of the
company, not just short term profits (Regan 65). This system has been
criticized for giving the banks too much power, but it has provided in-
dustry with considerable stability. Supervisory and management boards
in the publicly-traded corporations have not had to deal with many of the
problems that are all too frequent in the US: the savings and loan disas-
ter, government bailouts of large banks, insider trading, leveraged buy-
outs, hostile takeovers, junk bonds, etc. (Glouchevich 77).
The close ties between the major banks and industry began in the last
century. These banks were founded to finance industrialization, because
large amounts of privately held capital did not yet exist. In the immediate
post-war years bank finance was about the only source of start-up fund-
ing and working capital (Mole 33). The banking system has been very
effective in protecting publicly-traded companies against hostile take-
overs. German banks can not only vote the shares they own in a com-
pany, they are legally permitted to vote the shares they hold for their
customer; thus controlling as much as 60% of the voting power in some
companies (Drucker, Post Capitalist Society 77). As a result, hostile
takeovers are nearly impossible because they can simply be blocked (Hill
202). A few recent examples include the rescue of Escom, one of
Europe’s largest personal computer companies. When its 1995 loss was
three times its initial estimate, creditors, led by Commerzbank, put up 40
million marks in cash. The three key shareholders also guaranteed the
success of a capital increase that would raise an additional 60 million
marks (“As German PC Maker Posts Hefty Loss”). When Arabs threat-
ened to buy a controlling interest in Mercedes-Benz a few years ago,
Deutsche Bank intervened on behalf of the German economy to buy up
the shares that were for sale, thus protecting the company from takeover
(Thurow 34). Deutsche Bank further arranged for Siemens to take over
the ailing computer firm Nixdorf with the goal of preserving all the jobs
(Albert 108). In 1988 British Steel wanted to take over parts of Klöckner-
Humboldt-Deutz, a major producer of machinery and engines. This failed
due to intervention by Deutsche Bank (Randlesome 65). This also ex-
plains how Deutsche Bank acquired a 48.7% stake in Klöckner.
As competition from international banks and developing financial
markets becomes more intense, banks are having to adopt cost-cutting
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measures in order to offer attractive financial products to customers.
Even in a country where government makes job preservation a top prior-
ity, the large commercial banks have entered into negotiations with their
works councils to begin employment reductions (Keltner 65). Deutsche
Bank is in a multiyear program to eliminate 15% of its staff, mostly
through attrition (“High Costs Catch Up”). More interesting, however, is
the growing tendency of major banks to reduce or eliminate from their
portfolios industrial shareholdings in companies that have had problems
recently (“German Machine Maker”). Deutsche Bank’s large holdings in
Klöckner-Humboldt-Deutz, in the transportation group Daimler-Benz,
and in the leading construction company Philipp Holzmann will be
trimmed. These actions obviously appealed to shareholders, because
Deutsche Bank stock rose almost 1% on news of the possible portfolio
divestitures (“Deutsche Bank Decides”).
The losses these companies have incurred have resurrected the criti-
cism of the German system of corporate governance in which banks have
extensive connections to industry in the form of shareholdings as well as
representation on the company’s supervisory boards. As European
Community legislation continues to loosen regulations, German banks
may have to rethink the way they do business and become more dynamic
and competitive (Glouchevich 83).
THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF THE
STOCK MARKET AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE
“Shareholder value” is a concept that is gaining a foothold in Ger-
many as international financial competition increases and stock markets
gain power. Companies are reducing costs to achieve greater profits, and
share prices are rising. This is even happening in state-owned monopo-
lies as privatization gets underway. Budgets are under pressure because
new bosses, many from industry, are demanding products and services
that customers are willing to buy, and they want speed and efficiency in
getting them to market. In many cases, research and marketing depart-
ments are talking to each other for the first time. When the head of Deut-
sche Telekom’s optoelectronic-devices research group explained his laser
explorations to the management board member responsible for R&D, he
heard a new question: “How much money can it make for Deutsche
Telekom?” (“European Telecom”).
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The German stock market is still quite small, but it is growing. The
state secretary at the Finance Ministry feels it is the risk-averse nature of
German investors that has hampered the development of a more robust
market, stating “German investors see risk, while the Americans see pos-
sibilities” (“Germany Unveils More Details”). But attitudes have been
changing in the last decade. In 1987, only about 5% of the population
owned stock. By 1993 the number of shareholders has grown to about
10% of the population in the west. Most of the newcomers are in their
twenties and early thirties. They belong to a generation that has not seen
their inheritance diminished by war or hyperinflation (Randlesome 70).
This increased interest in the stock market influences the way companies
do business. Are they going to be more interested in building reserves
with long-term stability in mind or in paying big dividends to attract
shareholders and raise capital?
Top management positions in German industry have traditionally
been awarded to those with age and experience. Many of industry’s lead-
ers began as apprentices in their companies and gradually worked their
way to the top. This explains why there has always been an abundance of
top managers with technical rather than financial backgrounds and why
their investment decisions have been based on technical criteria and a
commitment to preserve technical leadership in the industry (Porter 376).
Now a generation of younger executives with a financial orientation are
moving in increasing numbers into top management positions, and com-
panies starting to think in terms of profit and loss (Porter 376) are turning
to international financial markets to raise the capital. Some examples
follow.
The privatization of Deutsche Telekom illustrates this trend. Before
privatization began in 1996 CEO Ron Sommer had to convince investors
that it is a profit-driven competitor and not a bloated former state agency
(Lowry-Miller 52). This was difficult. Consider the Essen pensioner who
got a $10,000 phone bill, even though she had averaged $35 a month for
the past 18 years. Since Telekom’s outdated systems could not produce
an itemization of the charges, she was not able to rebut them. Telekom
cut off the service. Because the woman had diabetes, the family tried to
have an emergency beeper installed through a local hospital, but
Telekom blocked that because she had not paid the first installment on
her bill. Telekom officials denied that they should have handled the case
differently (“Continent’s Wake-up Call”). It is not surprising that Deut-
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sche Bank, the leading underwriter in Deutsche Telekom’s upcoming
stock offering, has decided to target the German public with massive
media advertising about the benefits of shareholding prior to the offering
(“Germany Unveils More Details”).
Telekom needs to raise about $2 billion of this $10 billion initial of-
fering in the US, but since the US Securities and Exchange Commission
must approve a company’s financial accounting before granting the right
to list shares on the New York Stock Exchange, Telekom will probably
have to produce two sets of accounts like Daimler-Benz did, one US-
style and one German-style (Covill 42). But this is only one hurdle. Po-
tential investors feel the work force needs to be cut in half for the com-
pany to be competitive, which is not easy given Germany’s tough labor
laws (“Deutsche Telekom’s Biggest Sales Pitch”). If pressure keeps em-
ployment levels too high, the stock offering could be in trouble (Lowry-
Miller 53).
When Jürgen Schrempp became CEO at Daimler-Benz, he immedi-
ately initiated cost-cutting measures by selling the biggest loss-making
divisions and cutting the staff at corporate headquarters. His goals were
“transparency, honesty and immediate disclosure of information.” He set
a high goal for Daimler’s diverse operations: a return on capital of at
least 12%, coupled with a requirement to be as profitable as international
rivals (“Daimler-Benz Chief Steers”). Ironically, Daimler-Benz is the
subject of a lawsuit by an activist shareholder group that says company
officials deliberately misled investors into expecting a profit in 1995.
Instead the company sustained a DM 5.7 billion loss (“Daimler, After
Record ’95 Loss”). It was disclosed at the annual shareholders meeting in
May 1996 that management was in fact aware of the risk before the profit
prediction was made (“Daimler Waited”). Shareholders may have gone
without a dividend in 1995, but the members of the management board
got a bonus of about DM 600,000 each for the “great burden they bore”
in that year. German accounting principles, unlike American ones, do not
require that individual salaries be revealed, but altogether the eight board
members received nearly DM 11 million in salary for the year (“Daimler
Executive Bonuses”). Shareholders were not pleased.
SGL Carbon was an unprofitable subsidiary of chemical giant
Hoechst, when the CEO decided to sell it off. Today SGL is the envy of
corporate Germany, with huge profits and stock that has tripled in value
since its initial public offering last year in Frankfurt. CEO Robert Koe-
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hler accomplished this turnaround by “becoming less German.” By
changing over to more transparent US accounting methods, the company
gained access to badly needed capital with the NYSE listing. Koehler has
become one of Germany’s most outspoken advocates of the US concept
of increasing shareholder value, calling it “a debate even the unions can’t
escape” (“German Ugly Duckling”). During the last ten years, reforms
have been underway to deregulate the country’s financial markets with
the aim to keep them competitive as integration occurs at the EC level.
Large companies have pushed for stock market reforms to help increase
share value and to bring German law in line with that of other European
countries (“Germany Unveils More Details”). Along with the relatively
new futures and options exchange, Frankfurt is well on the way to be-
coming a world competitor.
LABOR AND JOB SECURITY
For most of the postwar period German business has been extremely
private. The dual arrangement of supervisory board and management
board in the major companies has separated shareholders’ interests from
those of management while at the same time safeguarding employees’
needs. The number of jobs a company provides has traditionally been as
important as its sales volume or profitability (Bowles 22). Strong unions
and strong management form an effective alliance against capital inter-
ests, opting for high wages and benefits over profits paid out as dividends
to shareholders (Glouchevich 114). It is interesting that the issues that
have divided unions and employers recently are more concerned with
working hours. This reflects a change away from the high performance
society to a leisure society. Time to enjoy life has become more impor-
tant than overtime in factories (Randlesome 120).
With international competition, the high cost of domestic labor, more
transparent accounting methods, and increased shareholder scrutiny,
companies have little choice but to adopt cost-cutting measures. Many
industries have excess worker capacity, but labor’s strength means that
laying off workers is very expensive. Some companies have adressed this
problem by shortening the work week to four days at reduced pay. The
savings is then used to retrain surplus workers and offer incentives for
early retirement. Redividing existing jobs to avoid cutbacks in social
services is not uncommon. Nevertheless, nineteen of the twenty largest
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firms in Germany reported that they laid off employees in the recession
of 1992–93 (Schlaes, “Germany’s Chained Economy” 114–17).
Some companies are finding ways around the unions. The chemical
giant Hoechst has put its European fibers division into a separate limited
company. In theory, the company will be free to negotiate its own con-
tracts with employees, rather than being subject to the wage agreements
and working conditions specified by the German chemical union and
employers associations. Another major chemical company, Bayer, has
placed its fibers divisions in a separate company paying union wages, but
without the lucrative benefits (Williams 18). Early in 1995 comprehen-
sive legislation concerning the restructuring of companies took effect,
and changes of this nature are likely to become more common. It will
facilitate not only mergers, acquisitions, and unrelated diversifications,
but demergers (spin-offs) as well (Stengel 86–88).
Relocation of production outside of Germany is becoming the norm
(Schlaes, “Germany’s Unchained Economy” 117) and sometimes it is not
far from home. Commerce is intense along the border between Bavaria
and western Bohemia. The most common arrangement is simple contract
labor, in which a Bavarian company ships components or partly finished
goods to Bohemia for finishing or assembly (“Propinquity Pays”). Many
feel that if tax reforms do not lessen the social burdens on employers,
German industry will concentrate more on exporting jobs rather than
goods (Javetski 78). Other companies, however, have taken advantage of
lower labor costs while simultaneously establishing a presence in one of
their important export markets, for example, the NAFTA countries.
BMW built a new manufacturing facility in South Carolina where labor
costs are roughly half those at home (Bowles 24). Mercedes-Benz is
building a sport utility vehicle in Alabama, which marks the first time the
company has produced a new car outside Germany (Foust 100).
THE SMALL- TO MEDIUM-SIZE COMPANIES: THE MITTELSTAND
Thousands of small and medium-size companies, many of them fam-
ily-owned, comprise the Mittelstand. They typically make very special-
ized products, with world market shares in the range of 80% to 90%. As
a whole this group accounts for most of Germany’s enviable trade bal-
ance (Bowles 22–23). The names of these companies are not familiar to
most people because their products generally form part of the manufac-
turing process, rather than being the end product itself. For example, the
CHANGING FACE OF GERMAN BUSINESS 155
Rohr company makes floating clamshell dredges for the sand and gravel
industry. There are thirty-two of these machines in this country and the
Rohr company made thirty-one of them. Companies in this industrial
segment get premium prices for their machines; in return the purchaser
gets the latest in technical innovation as well as immediate and excellent
service.
In the past, Mittelstand companies have had little interest in joint
ventures or partnerships with foreign companies, American or otherwise.
They prefered to do their manufacturing in Germany and be their own
representatives abroad. Now companies are actively seeking ties to US
companies. Why? During 1993 alone, some 15,150 companies failed,
throwing 200,000 people on the unemployment rolls and piling up $12
billion in debt (Salz-Trautman 46). These companies dominated the ma-
chine tool industry, and as suppliers to an ailing auto industry, they suf-
fered from the car makers’ efforts to slash costs. Financing is a problem.
If Germany’s stock market were more vigorously interested in small
shares, new managers could be hired and capital raised more easily. Un-
ions would oppose this, however, because private companies are not re-
quired to appoint workers to their boards (“Champions in Pain”). Be-
tween 1984 and 1988, for example, just 70 small- and medium-sized
companies turned to first-time stock issues as a means of raising funds
(Keltner 62). Banking conservatism plus the lack of a stock market re-
ceptive to small issues tends to stifle entrepreneurial growth and innova-
tion (Mole 33). The Mittelstand companies account for almost half of the
industrial output and retailing, but they need professional managers, new
marketing techniques, and easier access to capital in order to survive or
avoid being acquired by rivals (Salz-Trautmann 46). One of the points in
Kohl’s April 1996 tax reform plan was to make venture capital more ac-
cessible (“Germany’s Kohl …”).
Many older entrepreneurs are ready to retire, but wish to have their
businesses survive as private companies with the family name. Often,
however, no members of the family are willing to take over. About
300,000 such firms are scheduled to be passed from one generation to the
next between now and the year 2000. Inheritance taxes on business assets
are so high that four out of ten prospective heirs are unwilling to take the




The cost of reunification with the former East Germany as well as the
continuing progress toward European economic and political union have
forced some changes, while others were already in progress. If reunifica-
tion and European Union had not been occurring simultaneously, both
may have been easier. How long it will take for East Germany to reach
the same level of affluence as the West is unknown, but it will likely be
achieved in the same way as it was in the West, through manufacturing
and export. Tax reform has become a necessity; the social security net is
endangered by an aging population and high unemployment. Privatiza-
tion of former state monopolies and the search for international invest-
ment capital has led to more transparent financial accounting. Share-
holder scrutiny is forcing companies to pay closer attention to the bottom
line, and this often means that workforces have to be substantially re-
duced or production moved out of Germany. But change is inevitable if
Germany is to maintain its position as an industrial powerhouse into the
next century. The consequences of these changes will continue to have an
impact on the decade of the ’90s and beyond.
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